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Abstract—While the appeal of scientific materialism has been weakened by developments in theoretical physics, 
chemistry and biology, Pythagoreanism still attracts the allegiance of leading scientists and mathematicians. It is 
this doctrine that process philosophers must confront if they are to successfully defend their metaphysics. Peirce, 
Bergson and Whitehead were acutely aware of the challenge of Pythagoreanism, and attempted to circumvent it. 
The problem addressed by each of these thinkers was how to account for the success of mathematical physics if 
the world consists of creative processes. In this paper I critically examine the nature of the challenge posed by 
Pythagoreanism to process philosophy and examine the efforts by process philosophers, particularly Whitehead, 
to overcome it, and offer some suggestions for advancing these efforts.   
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In an anthology devoted to Nicholas Rescher, After 
Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, 
Lieven Decock argued that substance philosophy no 
longer stands as a serious challenge to process 
philosophy; the real alternative to process 
philosophy comes from neo-Pythagoreanism.1 
While in response, Rescher dismissed this claim, it 
is clear that leading scientists are more likely to be 
committed to neo-Pythagoreanism than process 
philosophy. Roger Penrose, for instance, begins his 
massive exposition of the state of modern physics, 
The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws 
of the Universe, with a defence of Pythagoreanism.2 
Many proponents of complexity theory see it not in 
relation to process philosophy but as the triumph of 
Pythagoreanism. Pythagoreanism underpins the 
quest by physicists for an ultimate ‘theory of 
everything’, that is, ’a single all-embracing picture 
of all the laws of nature from which the inevitability 
of all things seen must follow with unimpeachable 
logic.’3 It seems to me that the challenge of 
                                                        
1 Lieven Decock, ‘The Taming of Change’, in After 
Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, Frankfurt: 
Ontos, 2004, pp.95-111. 
2 Roger Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to 
the Laws of the Universe, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2005, 
p.5ff. 
3 John D. Barrow, Theories of Everything: The Quest for 
Ultimate Explanation, London: Vintage, 1992, p.1. 
Pythagoreanism to process philosophy is greater 
than Rescher credits it. 
Furthermore, to fully understand the importance of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Henri Bergson and Alfred 
North Whitehead to the tradition of process 
philosophy it is necessary to properly appreciate 
this challenge. Scientific materialism was only one 
form of Pythagoreanism, and the demolition of this 
doctrine was not in itself enough to establish 
process philosophy as its necessary successor. The 
reason why Peirce and Whitehead, and to a lesser 
extent Bergson, are more important to the tradition 
of process thought than William James or John 
Dewey is that they understood the achievements 
and problems of the Pythagorean tradition and 
attempted to go beyond Pythagoreanism in a way 
that would do justice to its achievements. 
How could this be done? To begin with, it was 
necessary to comprehend the achievements of 
Pythagoreanism, and then clarify its problems. To 
some extent the achievements of Pythagoreanism 
are more obvious; they are evident in the successes 
of mathematical physics. The advance of 
mathematical physics has been associated with 
clarity of thought and explanation unrivalled 
elsewhere. A major problem with Pythagoreanism 
is that it seems to render the conscious beings, 
which are advancing mathematical physics, 
unintelligible. How would it be possible for beings 
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‘governed in completely precise detail by 
mathematical principles’, as Penrose put it,4 to 
come to understand and know this and what it 
means? This problem manifests an even deeper 
problem, a problem which Peirce, Bergson and 
Whitehead were alive to: that the ideal of 
explanation to which Pythagoreanism is committed 
makes the evolution of any real variety, let alone 
the evolution of conscious beings, unintelligible. As 
Peirce put it:  
Is there such a thing in nature as increase in 
variety? Were things simpler, was variety less in 
the original nebula from which the solar system 
is supposed to have grown than it is now when 
the land and the sea swarms with animals and 
plant forms with their intricate anatomies and still 
more wonderful economies? It would seem as if 
there were an increase in variety, would it not? 
And yet mechanical law, which the scientific 
infallibilist tells us is the only agency of nature, 
mechanical law can never produce 
diversification. That is a mathematical truth – a 
proposition of analytic mechanics; and anybody 
can see without any algebraical apparatus that 
mechanical law out of like antecedents can only 
produce like consequents. It is the very idea of 
law.5 
Bergson made the same point when he wrote that 
‘no complication of the mathematical with itself, 
however elaborate we may suppose it, can 
introduce an atom of novelty in the world.’6 The 
problem is, as Émile Meyerson (almost certainly 
under the influence of Bergson7) pointed out, the 
model of explanation which modern science has 
embraced, involves showing that what appears to be 
variety or diversity is not really diversity at all but 
only the appearance of an underlying identity. 
Consequently, as he argued: ‘scientific explanation 
actually ends up dissolving the external world into 
undifferentiated space.’8 Elaborating on this, he 
wrote: 
[D]iversity in space is unquestionably an enigma 
for us, a ground for astonishment if not identical, 
at least very similar to that we discover in the 
case of diversity in time. As a consequence we 
cannot escape the conclusion that if our reasoning 
                                                        
4 Penrose, The Road to Reality, p.19. 
5 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Synechism, Fallibilism, and 
Evolution’ [1897] in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. 
Justus Buchler, New York, Dover Publications, 1955, p.357. 
6 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, [1907] trans. Arthur 
Mitchell, Lanham: University Press of America, 1984, p.217. 
7 Émile Meyerson, Identity & Reality, [1908]  trans. Kate 
Loewenberg, New York: Dover, 1962, p.13. 
8 Émile Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, [1921] trans. 
Mary-Alice and David A. Sipfle, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991, p.1. 
is correct, the goal of explanations and theories is 
really to replace the infinitely diverse world 
around us by identity in time and space, which 
clearly can only be space itself.9 
Or, as G. Spencer Brown put it more dramatically: 
To explain, literally to lay out in a plane where 
particulars can be readily seen. Thus to place or 
plan in flat land, sacrificing other dimensions for 
the sake of appearance. Thus to expound or put 
out at the cost of ignoring the reality or richness 
of what is so put out. Thus to take a view away 
from its prime reality or royalty, or to gain 
knowledge and lose the kingdom10. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM 
How did such a notion of explanation emerge? And 
what is its relation to mathematics?11 The problem 
really became evident in Ancient Greece and 
emerged out of different strands of Anaximander’s 
philosophy. It was Anaximander who originated the 
idea of the cosmos, and it was probably he who first 
deployed the term kosmos to characterize this.12 It 
appears that Anaximander was also the first thinker 
to propose what in Ancient Greece became the 
standard form of explanation for the cosmos, first, 
postulating an undifferentiated unity, secondly, 
arguing that from this unity two opposite powers 
separated out to form the world order and thirdly, 
showing how these two opposites unite again to 
generate life. Anaximander postulated the apeiron 
or ‘unlimited’ as the all-enfolding and all-
controlling, divine and immortal and indestructible 
source of the cosmos. Through limitation (peirata) 
of the unlimited the cosmos emerges, to begin with 
by generating the polar opposites: on the one hand, 
hot, dry, bright and rare; on the other, cold, damp, 
dark and dense.13 It was the interaction between 
these that generated the diversity of the cosmos, the 
celestial bodies, meteorological phenomena, the sea 
and dry land, animal life and humans. In 
characterizing celestial bodies, Anaximander was 
the first mathematical physicist outside Babylon. 
Given the dimensions he postulated, he evidently 
                                                        
9 Meyerson, Explanation in the Sciences, p.136f. 
10 G. Spencer Brown, Laws of Form, London, George Allen 
and Unwin, 1969, p.126n. 
11 The following history is a condensed version of my longer 
paper, ‘Mathematics, Explanation and Reductionism: 
Exposing the Roots of the Egyptianism of European 
Civilization, Cosmos and History, 1:1, 2005, 54-89. 
12 See Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of 
Greek Cosmology, [1960] Indianapolis, Hackett, 1994, 
Appendix I. 
13 See Paul Seligman, The Apeiron of Anaximander, Athlone 
Press: The University of London, 1962, p.122. 
 WHITEHEAD AND PYTHAGORAS  
Concrescence 2006 Vol.7 pp. 3-19 ISSN 1445-4297 © Arran Gare, 2006. 
 
5
believed that the universe was governed by simple 
mathematical ratios.14 On this basis he argued that 
‘The earth is aloft, not dominated by anything; it 
remains in place because of the similar distance 
from all points [of the celestial circumference].’15 
This, as noted by Charles Kahn, involved a new 
form of mathematical reasoning. It is, as he put it, 
‘a general expression for the principle of symmetry 
or indifference. It is indeed the same notion which 
was glorified in modern time by Leibniz as his 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, according to which 
everything which is true or real implies a reason 
why it is so and not otherwise.’16 But outside the 
celestial realm, and despite reference to the 
immortal apeiron, the kosmos was conceived by 
Anaximander as dynamic and historical. Here, 
mathematical reasoning had at most a very 
subordinate position. Life had evolved and was 
continuing to evolve. The first living beings had 
emerged in moisture and migrated to drier parts, 
and humans had evolved from fish.  
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans appear to have 
accepted the basic structure of Anaximander’s 
cosmology, but radically extended the place 
accorded to mathematics. While the Pythagoreans 
built on the mathematics developed by the 
Egyptians and Babylonians and by Thales and 
Anaximander, according to Proclus, it was they 
who developed it as a systematic body of 
knowledge ‘seeking its first principles in ultimate 
ideas, and investigating its theorems abstractly and 
in a purely intellectual way.’17 While the basic 
principle and root of all things was taken to be 
number, the basic principle and root (arche) of 
number was taken to be the Monad or Unity. ‘One’ 
was not taken to be a number, but as the principle 
underlying number conceived as diversity, which in 
turn is the condition for achieving relations between 
diversity. That is, the triadic form of explanation of 
the cosmos was taken over from Anaximander, but 
was conceived in mathematical terms. As the 
historian of Pythagorean thought, Kenneth Sylvan 
Guthrie, put it, ‘If One represents the principle of 
Unity from which all things arise, then Two, the 
Dyad, represents Duality, the beginning of 
multiplicity, the beginning of strife, yet also the 
possibility of logos, the relation of one thing to 
                                                        
14 Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, 
p.96f. 
15 Quoted Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek 
Cosmology, p.76. 
16 Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, 
p.77. 
17 Cited by Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity, 2nd 
ed. [1963], Princeton Junction, The Scholar’s Bookshelf, 
1988, p.36. 
another.'18 In the movement from one to two to three 
to four we have a return to unity of the tetractys of 
the Decad (an equilateral triangle of ten points), 
which was taken to be perfect and to embrace the 
whole of nature. For instance One represents the 
point, Two represent the line, Three represents the 
surface, and Four the tetrahedron, the first three 
dimensional form, the Tetraktys representing this 
emerging multiplicity from unity as the unity of the 
Decad. So, as Theon of Smyrna put it, ‘the Decad 
determines every number, including the nature of 
everything, of the even and the odd, of the mobile 
and immobile, of good and evil.’19 The Decad was 
identified with kosmos (conceived as ‘world-
order’), essentially a mathematic harmony. There 
was no distinction between physical bodies and 
ideal mathematical constructions, or between rigid 
geometrical form and the vital processes of living 
things; numbers were thought to be separated by 
breathing in spirit and void out of the unlimited.20 
The Pythagoreans identified the unlimited with 
Even numbers and limit with the Odd and saw the 
world order as compounded of these elements. The 
Unlimited is indefinite and in need of Limit which 
is a definite boundary. The study of number was 
divided into four branches: arithmetic which deals 
with number in itself, geometry which deals with 
number in space, music or harmonics which deals 
with number in time, and astronomy which deals 
with number in space and time. With this doctrine 
the Pythagoreans were led to examine the 
relationships of numbers and geometrical forms as a 
means to investigate the entire cosmos, extending 
Anaximander’s presupposition that everything that 
is true or real requires a ‘sufficient reason’ to 
explain why it is so and not otherwise. But they did 
not do this entirely consistently. Their ideas 
resemble numerology rather than modern 
mathematical physics, and this obscured the full 
implications of their views from being appreciated. 
This quest by the Pythagoreans for rigorous 
explanation was taken up by Parmenides, who took 
the principle of sufficient reason to its logical 
conclusion. Focusing on what is intelligible he 
concluded that there is simply the One or unity of 
Being. There can be no development of diversity 
from the One and so no harmonizing of the diverse. 
Such would imply coming into being and ceasing to 
be. Since this assumes that we can know a prior 
state of not being, which is by definition not, and 
therefore unknowable, this is unintelligible, 
Parmenides argued. The only secure way to truth is 
                                                        
18 Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook , p.21. 
19 Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook, p.171. 
20 Aristotle, Physics, 213 b22. 
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that  which concerns what ‘is’, and this cannot 
come to be or perish, change or move, nor be 
subject to imperfection. So, from postulating more 
abstract entities and charting new notions of 
intelligibility in comprehending these abstract 
entities and their relations pioneered by 
Anaximander and developed by Pythagoras, 
Parmenides focused on this abstract realm of 
thought and what is intelligible and concluded that 
the world that we normally take to be reality is 
merely the opinion of men. This did not stop him 
going on to elaborate a whole cosmology, 
portraying the cosmos as developing out of the 
opposition between light and night, but at the same 
time he denigrated such accounts as nothing but 
inventions of the human mind. Parmenides 
defended his claims by showing the logical 
coherence of his ideas and that the alternatives to 
them led to contradictions. This was the origin of 
logic (as ‘dialectic’), which was further developed 
by Parmenides’ student, Zeno, who used it to show 
the incoherence of believing in plurality or motion. 
Parmenides’ arguments were based on two 
assumptions: that logically true things and 
properties of real things coincide, and that any 
proposition is either true or false; there can be no 
third case.21 Both of these assumptions came to be 
accepted and have pervaded thought ever since 
(although each assumption has been questioned). 
 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF PYTHAGOREANISM 
Almost all subsequent thinking about the cosmos 
has involved efforts to embrace the rigor of 
Parmenides while evading his conclusions. With the 
revival of Pythagoreanism in the seventeenth 
century these conclusions were avoided through 
postulates of a creative deity or creative minds not 
subject to the laws governing the physical world, or 
in the case of Leibniz who seemed to have most 
clearly seen the problem, by postulating a deity who 
created an infinite diversity of monads which would 
unfold in harmony so that each monad would 
reflect in itself to different degrees this harmonious 
order. Kant dealt with the problem by arguing that 
the world as understood through mathematics is 
only the world of appearances, experience 
organized through imagination, the forms of 
intuition and the categories of the understanding, 
not reality as it is in itself. However, as these 
                                                        
21 For an analysis of Parmenides’ and Zeno’s arguments, see 
George Kampis, Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and 
Cognitive Science: A New Framework A New Framework for 
Dynamics, Information and Complexity, Oxford, Pergamon 
Press, 1991, p.84ff. 
postulates and evasions were discarded, the 
problem arose again to haunt natural philosophy.22 
Most scientists embraced the assumptions which 
led to Parmenides conclusions, usually without 
fully appreciating the significance of what they 
were doing. Process philosophers reacted against 
these conclusions and critically examined the 
assumptions that led to them. How did Bergson, 
Peirce and Whitehead deal with these issues? 
 
BERGSON’S PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Bergson was concerned to show the delusory nature 
of the achievements of mathematical physics, or 
more generally, the analytic intellect, attempting to 
do so in a way that would point to different way of 
knowing the world free from the distortions of this 
defective form of knowledge. The intellect, 
Bergson argued, freezes reality as extension in 
space in order to analyse it and reveal how to 
control it. It is within this impoverished experience 
of reality that mathematics finds mathematical 
order. Knowledge gained in this way is extremely 
important to humans in their efforts to control 
nature, but it only cognizes nature insofar as it can 
be controlled. But it does not and cannot grasp 
reality as such, as creative becoming. The cardinal 
sin of philosophers is to have confused the 
extension grasped by the intellect with durational 
creative becoming.23 Even in the work in which he 
concentrated most fully on developing his 
cosmology, Creative Evolution, Bergson was 
primarily concerned to free experience of this 
creative becoming from spatializing intellectual 
knowledge and to show how the latter is a 
derivative and defective form of knowledge. In 
Creative Evolution Bergson characterized the 
seductive achievements of mathematics: 
When we consider the admirable order of 
mathematics, the perfect agreement of the objects 
it deals with, the immanent logic in numbers and 
figures, our certainty of always getting the same 
conclusion, however diverse and complex our 
reasonings on the same subject, we hesitate to see 
in properties apparently so positive a system of 
negations, the absence rather than the presence of 
a true reality. …. The complexity the intellect 
puts into its object by analysing it, the more 
complex is the order it finds there. And this order 
and this complexity necessarily appear to the 
intellect as a positive reality, since reality and 
intellectuality are turned in the same direction. 
                                                        
22 This is the theme of Barrow’s book, Theories of Everything. 
23 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.210 n.1. 
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This mathematical order and complexity, Bergson 
argued, while appearing to the intellect as a positive 
reality, is achieved through an inversion of the will 
and suppression of positive reality. This creates ‘at 
once extension in space and the admirable order 
which mathematics finds there.’24 So, ‘the infinite 
complexity of the parts and their perfect 
coordination among themselves are created at one 
and the same time by an inversion which is, at 
bottom, an interruption, that is to say, a diminution 
of positive reality.’25 Bergson argued that it is the 
function of the intellect to construe reality in this 
way, leading it to construe the world as a 
geometrical order. As he put it: 
All the operations of our intellect tend to 
geometry as to the goal where they find their 
perfect fulfilment. But geometry is necessarily 
prior to them (since these operations have not as 
their end to construct space and cannot do 
otherwise than take it as given) it is evident that it 
is a latent geometry, immanent in our idea of 
space, which is the main spring of our intellect 
and the cause of its working.26 
Both deduction and induction presuppose this 
spatial intuition.  
Through exposing how the intellect works and 
pervades almost every aspect of our thinking, 
Bergson sought to reveal an alternative way of 
understanding nature, the path he claimed should be 
pursued by philosophy. It is through intuition that 
we appreciate the reality of durational becoming, 
and Bergson argued that the intuition of duration is 
prior to and the condition of the kind of thinking 
associated with the intellect. Through the use of 
intuition, he argued, philosophy can ‘turn the mind 
homeward’ to ‘coincide with the living principle 
whence it emanates’, thereby to ‘study becoming in 
general’. This is ‘the true evolutionism and 
consequently the true continuation of science.’27 
Bergson’s concern was to develop an appreciation 
of the kind of order associated with becoming as 
durational. Duration is not infinitely divisible; 
existence is durational, with different processes 
existing over different durations. Duration implies a 
reality in which the past in some sense really exists 
and can be intuited as that which no longer acts but 
is still intimately related to the present, while the 
future is not yet created. Bergson frequently 
invoked the example of music to illustrate this 
connection of the indestructible past to the present 
and its movement into the future, but also pointed 
                                                        
24 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.210. 
25 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.210. 
26 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.210. 
27 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p.369f. 
out that listening to a word or a sentence also 
manifests this integral relation between sounds or 
words that have already been uttered and the 
present.28 On this basis nature was portrayed as 
creative, continually generating novelty not 
predictable from antecedent states of the universe. 
While initially focussing on the mind, Bergson later 
strove to develop a cosmology based on 
appreciation of this durational becoming, a world of 
creative evolution. 
 
PEIRCE’S PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Mathematics, Peirce argued, is the science which 
draws necessary conclusions from exclusively 
hypothetical states of things.29 An hypothesis is ‘a 
proposition imagined to be strictly true of an ideal 
state of things’.30 Necessary conclusions are drawn 
by mathematicians through the use of diagrams 
which function as an analogy to such hypotheses. 
As he put it: 
[Mathematical] deduction consists in con-
structing an icon or diagram the relations of 
whose parts shall present a complete analogy 
with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, 
or experimenting upon this image in the 
imagination, and of observing the result so as to 
discover unnoticed and hidden relations among 
the parts.31  
Peirce rejected the idea of mathematics as the 
science of pure space, as De Morgan had proposed, 
or as the science of pure time, as Rowan Hamilton 
had proposed.32 While if an hypothesis turned out 
to be true of an actual state of affairs then 
conclusions drawn from it would be necessary, it 
can never be known with certainty (or 
apodictically) that the hypothesis is true of an actual 
state of affairs. In other words, Peirce, following to 
some extent Kant, rejected the Parmenidean 
assumption that logically true things and the 
properties of real things coincide. Having rejected 
this, Peirce gave a central place to non-deductive 
inference, what he called ‘ampliative inference’ (to 
emphasise its creative nature), involving not only 
induction, but also ‘abduction’, speculative 
                                                        
28 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, Totowa: Littlefield, 
Adams and Co., 1975, p.74. 
29 Peirce, ‘The Nature of Mathematics, in Philosophical 
Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler, New York: Dover, 
1955, p.137 & 140. 
30 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘The Nature of Mathematics’, 
p.137. 
31 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘On the Algebra of Logic’ in The 
Essential Peirce, Vol.1, p.227.  
32 Peirce, ‘The Nature of Mathematics, p.136. 
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thinking, in the logic of inquiry.33 That is, he gave a 
place to creative imagination in the development of 
knowledge. He defended the use of analogy as well 
as hypotheses in such inference and justified the use 
of non-mathematical terms which cannot be 
precisely defined to characterized reality. These are 
the objective or real ‘vagues’.34  
Since the world quite obviously has evolved 
enormous variety, Peirce rejected Pythagoreanism. 
He argued that the fact that aspects of the world can 
be understood through mathematically expressed 
laws should not be merely accepted but must be 
accounted for – as the result of evolution from a 
chaotic world. Peirce defended a form of objective 
idealism, suggesting that nature is originally mind; 
or, as he put it ‘a chaos of unpersonalized 
feeling.’35 As mind it was prone to develop habits 
of action (equivalent to the ‘limiting’ of 
Anaximander). Matter is the outcome of the mind 
developing inveterate habits (becoming more 
limited in its freedom) and is thus nothing but effete 
mind.36 As nature developed habits it also became 
possible to interpret these habits as signs, and on 
this basis, make predictions. Peirce characterized 
the sign most generally as ‘anything which is so 
determined by something else, called its Object, and 
so determines an effect upon a person, which effect 
I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby 
mediately determined by the former.’ He quickly 
corrected this definition, however, writing to Lady 
Welby, ‘My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to 
Cerebrus, because I despair of making my own 
broader conception understood.’37 For Peirce, signs 
and their interpretation pervade nature. The 
universe, he wrote, ‘is perfused with signs, if it is 
not composed exclusively of signs.’38 However, this 
too is misleading.  For there to be semiosis, there 
must first be ‘chance’ and second ‘Brute reaction’ 
without which semiosis would have nothing on 
                                                        
33 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘The Doctrine of Necessity 
Examined’ in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical 
Writings, Volume 1 (1867-1893), Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992, p.300. 
34 See Peirce, ‘Issues of Pragmatism’ in The Essential 
Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol.2 (1893-1913) 
ed. The Peirce Edition Project, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998, p.350f. 
35 Peirce, ‘The Architecture of Theories’ in The Essential 
Peirce, Vol.1, p.297. 
36 Peirce, ‘The Law of Mind’, in Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce, Vol.1, p.136, and ‘Man’s Glassy Essence’ in The 
Essential Peirce, Vol.1, p.348f. 
37 Peirce, ‘Excerpts from letters to Lady Welby’, The Essential 
Peirce, Vol.2 (1893-1913), p.478. 
38 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Works, Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-58, 5.448n. 
which to operate.39 Semiosis as the production and 
interpretation of signs, has evolved from a world of 
chance and brute reaction. As Peirce conceived it, 
semiosis is triadic, and thus lends itself to forming 
sequences and networks of semiosis, with 
interpretants becoming increasingly complex. 
Matter, the outcome of mind developing inveterate 
habits, although always involving some element of 
chance and associated with the development of ever 
more complex and creative forms of semiosis, can 
now be interpreted through mathematically 
expressible law (although even here actuality will 
involve an element of chance and so will not 
entirely conform to the necessity of mathematical 
deductions). This interpretation of matter through 
mathematics is simply a further development of 
semiosis, made possible by the tendency of nature 
to develop habits, but as such, is subordinate to the 
interpretation of all this through Peirce’s 
characterization of nature, matter and semiosis. 
Peirce only sketched his cosmology on this basis, 
proclaiming that ‘Before this can be accepted it 
must show itself capable of explaining the 
tridimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and 
the general characteristics of the universe, with 
mathematical clearness and precision; for no less 
should be demanded of every philosophy.’40  The 
clarity of mathematics was still exalted, 
Pythagoreanism was accorded appropriate 
recognition, but it was subordinated to a form of 
process philosophy. 
 
WHITEHEAD’S PROPOSED SOLUTION 
It is more difficult to interpret Whitehead’s 
proposed solution to this problem than Bergson’s or 
Peirce’s. Whitehead was more fundamentally 
influenced by the Pythagorean tradition, and the 
speculative turn in his philosophy in which he 
embraced the central place Peirce had allotted to 
‘ampliative inference’ associated with abduction, 
which Whitehead referred to as ‘speculative 
thought’, came relatively late in his career. To some 
extent, Whitehead was responding to Bergson, and 
indirectly to Peirce (who influenced both James and 
Dewey while contributing to the development of 
symbolic logic). Whitehead was attempting to 
develop a form of process philosophy that could not 
be charged with anti-intellectualism. As he wrote in 
the ‘Preface’ to Process and Reality, ‘I am also 
greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and 
                                                        
39 Peirce, ‘Reasoning and the Logic of Things, Lecture 8,’ 
Collected Works, 6.202. 
40 Peirce, ‘The Architecture of Theories’ in The Essential 
Peirce, Vol.1, p.296. 
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John Dewey. One of my preoccupations has been to 
rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-
intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been 
associated with it.’41 This concern to avoid anti-
intellectualism was partly responsible for a more 
favourable attitude towards the Pythagorean 
tradition, and his alliance to the Pythagoreans was 
affirmed in what was one of his last publications, 
‘Mathematics and the Good’ which he contributed 
to the Library of Living Philosophers tradition 
devoted to his work: The Philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead.42 Even more than Peirce’s, his 
philosophy manifests the quest to both affirm the 
achievements of the Pythagoreans while going 
beyond it to give a central place to creative 
becoming. His proposed solution works at several 
levels. 
To begin with, he treated mathematics as 
abstraction. Whitehead did not denigrate 
abstraction. He praised it and what has been 
achieved by it, particularly the abstractions of 
mathematics; but he decried the tendency to take 
abstractions as concrete reality, ignoring the level 
of abstraction involved and ignoring the 
background concrete unity of experience. This is 
the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, a fallacy 
which characterises the world-view of scientific 
materialists who take colourless atoms moving in 
space to be real and dismiss as unreal the sensible 
world around us. To highlight the limitations of the 
abstractions of the scientific materialists, in which 
matter is construed in a way that is amenable to 
mathematical treatment, Whitehead pointed out that 
this is incapable of evolution; but this does not 
mean that there is no evolution. It means that the 
abstractions of the scientific materialists are too 
limited to grasp this evolution. Whitehead analysed 
what is involved in abstracting. He argued that 
abstractions must always be understood in relation 
to the broader context from which they are made, 
ultimately, the broader context of the entire 
universe. Most importantly, Whitehead strove to 
develop more adequate abstractions. He attempted 
to elaborate a cosmology which gave a place to 
beautiful sunsets and provided an account of 
creative evolution while simultaneously showing 
how abstraction is both possible and an essential 
feature of life, and how there are beings who can 
both appreciate the beauty of a sunset while being 
capable of making and understanding the 
                                                        
41 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Corrected 
Edition, New York: The Free Press, 1978, p.xii. 
42 Alfred North Whitehead, ‘Mathematics and the Good’, The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, The library of Living 
Philosophers Volume III, 2nd ed. ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, La 
Salle: Open Court, 1951, pp.666-681. 
abstractions of mathematics. He did not do each of 
these sequentially, however; all Whitehead’s ideas 
on mathematics, abstraction, the nature of the 
cosmos of life and human life presupposed each 
other and were developed together. Still, it is 
necessary to begin somewhere, and the best starting 
point is Whitehead’s characterization abstraction, 
and particularly, abstraction associated with 
mathematics.  
According to Whitehead, ‘The growth of 
consciousness is the uprise of abstractions. It is the 
growth of emphasis. The totality is characterised by 
a selection from its details. … Thus a fortunate use 
of abstractions is of the essence of upward 
evolution.’43 When we abstract, ‘we necessarily 
introduce the notion of potentiality’ since we are 
considering what might be apart from what might 
be together.44 The highest form of abstraction 
grasps the ‘eternal objects’, the pure possibilities or 
‘forms of definiteness’, such as colours, numbers, 
relations and patterns. While Whitehead’s 
conception of these is equivalent in some ways to 
Platonic forms, Whitehead distanced himself from 
Platonism by firstly abandoning the notion of a 
‘realm’ of eternal objects (replacing ‘realm’ with 
‘multiplicity’ – a problematic term for Whitehead 
since he denied it referred to any reality) and then 
in his last major work, Modes of Thought, he 
apparently abandoned the notion of ‘eternal objects’ 
and replaced it with equivalents such as 
‘potentialities of definiteness’.45  
As a process of thought, abstraction is a disjoining 
of entities which are in fact joined, and an 
abstraction is an entity considered apart from some 
of the roles it has in the actual world. If abstraction 
is not to destroy its ‘massive basis for survival’, it 
must not deny ‘a preservative instinct aiming at the 
renewal of connection, which is the reverse of 
abstraction.’46 This preservative instinct is 
characterized by ‘the sense of realities behind 
abstractions’ in which ‘the sense of process is 
always present’: ‘There is the process of abstraction 
arising from the concrete totality of value 
experience, and this process points back to its 
origin.’47 Whitehead was concerned to emphasise 
the importance of this background experience. He 
noted in ‘Mathematics and the Good’: 
                                                        
43 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, [1938] New 
York: The Free Press, 1968, p.123. 
44 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.99. 
45 See William Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead’s 
Metaphysics, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959, p.195ff. 
46 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.123f. 
47 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.124. 
 ARRAN GARE 
Concrescence 2006 Vol.7 pp. 3-19 ISSN 1445-4297 © Arran Gare, 2006. 
 
10
The notion of the complete self-sufficiency of 
any item of finite knowledge is the fundamental 
error of dogmatism. Every such item derives its 
truth, and its very meaning, from its unanalysed 
relevance to the background which is the 
unbounded Universe. Not even the simplest 
notion of arithmetic escapes this inescapable 
condition for existence.48 
Consciousness, however, does not rest content with 
the ‘dumb sense of importance behind the veil’, as 
Whitehead characterized this unanalysed 
background. It seeks the essential connections 
‘within the apparent isolation of abstracted 
details.’49  
The development of mathematics and its 
application in science is part of the effort to go 
beyond mere abstractions to grasp these 
connections. Whitehead concurred with Bergson in 
holding that mathematics can never fully grasp 
concrete reality, but believed that more could be 
achieved through mathematics than Bergson had 
allowed. Mathematics, Whitehead argued, is the 
study of objective eternal objects: forms, relations 
and most importantly, patterns. It is only in special 
branches of mathematics that quantity and number 
are the dominant themes, and quantity by itself only 
provides a very crude understanding of nature. 
‘[B]eyond all questions of quantity’, Whitehead 
proclaimed, ‘there lie questions of pattern, which 
are essential for the understanding of nature.’50 
Mathematics is a ‘general science’ for the 
investigation of ‘patterns of connectedness, in 
abstraction from the particular relata and the 
particular modes of connection’.51 It is ‘the most 
powerful technique for the understanding of pattern, 
and for the relationships between patterns.’52 
Pattern, for Whitehead, ‘involves a concept of 
different modes of togetherness’.53 Following his 
criticism of the idea that abstractions could ever 
completely abstract from any possible context, 
Whitehead argued against the idea that mathematics 
deals in tautologies. When we say ‘twice three is 
six’, we are not saying that these two sides of the 
equation mean the same thing, but that two threes is 
a fluent process which become six as the completed 
fact. Even the statement ‘six equals six’ need not be 
                                                        
48 Alfred North Whitehead, ‘Mathematics and the Good’, The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur 
Schilpp, 2nd ed. La Salle: Open Court, 1951 p.670. 
49 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.124. 
50 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.143. 
51 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p.258ff & 196ff. 
52 Alfred North Whitehead, ‘Mathematics and the Good’, The 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur 
Schilpp, 2nd ed. La Salle: Open Court, 1951 p.678. 
53 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.143. 
a mere tautology; it could mean that six is a specific 
form of combination which issues in six as a datum 
for further process. So, for Whitehead, 
‘mathematics is concerned with certain forms of 
process issuing into forms which are components of 
further process.’54 The alternative, he complained 
‘is the reduction of the universe to a barren 
tautological absolute, with a dream of life and 
motion.’55 
While mathematics can illuminate patterns, 
including temporal patterns as modes of 
togetherness, it is still one-sided. There are aspects 
of reality that can never be grasped thought 
mathematics. As Whitehead complained of science 
(understood as the effort to understand the world 
through mathematics):  
Science can find no individual enjoyment in 
nature: Science can find no aim in nature: 
Science can find no creativity in nature; it finds 
mere rules of succession. … The reason for this 
blindness of physical science lies in the fact that 
such science only deals with half the evidence 
provided by human experience. It divides the 
seamless coat – or, to change the metaphor into a  
happier form, it examines the coat, which is 
superficial, and neglects the body which is 
fundamental.’56 
Pythagorean science must be complemented by 
other perspectives on reality: art, ethics, logic, 
religion, myths and philosophy. 
If there is one perspective that does aim at complete 
comprehensiveness it is philosophy. The goal of 
philosophy is to construct schemes that can 
interpret all items of experience. It aims at ‘full 
comprehensiveness’. One of Whitehead’s major 
legacies was to have elaborated a comprehensive 
metaphysics which did aim to provide 
interpretations of all items of experience. This 
metaphysical theory is complex. It was continually 
evolving through Whitehead’s work and has been 
interpreted in different ways by different 
commentators. So, it cannot be described here 
except in the most schematic way.  
For Whitehead, the ultimate existents (actual 
entities) are actual occasions, processes of 
concrescence which integrate or ‘ingress’ (that is, 
make ingredients) through the act of prehending the 
forms of definiteness of (or eternal objects realized 
in) past actual occasions (dative and subjective 
ingressions) and eternal objects as such (conceptual 
ingression). The most basic eternal objects are 
                                                        
54 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.92. 
55 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.93. 
56 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p.154. 
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contrasts, which are more basic than pattern, but 
these are the precondition for more complex forms 
of definiteness, including number, relations and 
patterns. Having postulated a plurality of actual 
entities which are by their very nature related to 
other actual entities, entities which come into being 
and perish, Whitehead built into the very 
foundations of his cosmology unity, multiplicity 
and creativity, his ‘categories of the ultimate’ 
reflecting his commitment to giving a place to 
these: ‘creativity’, ‘many’ and ‘one’. Actual 
occasions form a nexus when they prehend each 
other. A nexus forms a society when: 
(i) there is a common element of form illustrated 
in the definiteness of each of its included actual 
entities, and (ii) this common element of form 
arises in each member of the nexus by reason of 
the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions 
of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) 
these prehensions impose that condition of 
reproduction by reason of their inclusion of 
positive feelings of the common form.57 
The common form (or ‘complex eternal object’) is 
the defining characteristic of that society. When the 
genetic relatedness of actual occasions orders these 
serially, the society is a ‘personal order’. 
This cosmology provides a place for the ‘eternal 
objects’ of mathematics, most importantly patterns, 
while allowing that there are other kinds of eternal 
objects that are also ingredients in actual entities, 
and gives a place to decision and real creative 
emergence. Insofar as actual occasions prehend a 
common form of definiteness they create an order 
that can be comprehended through mathematics. 
Serial ordering requires an appreciation of 
mathematics understood dynamically. An eternal 
object chosen can be a possibility never before 
actualized. So, there can be real creativity in the 
universe. Some of this creativity will involve 
prehending new patterns, which can then be 
described mathematically after they have come into 
being. 
 
EVALUATING WHITEHEAD’S SOLUTION 
How successful are these proposed solutions? To 
begin with, we need to consider Whitehead’s 
proposed solution, since to some extent this draws 
on ideas developed by Peirce and Bergson and as 
such is an effort to go beyond them, and 
Whitehead’s proposal is by far the most fully 
worked out. Evaluating Whitehead’s ideas in this 
                                                        
57 Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.34.  
regard on the basis of my very schematic account of 
his ideas is problematic to say the least. Despite 
this, I think that something useful can be said on 
this basis, and in fact, I will court caricature by 
attempting to illuminate Whitehead’s philosophy by 
showing its applicability in practice. I will do this in 
order to suggest limitations to Whitehead’s 
philosophy. Rather than evaluating the ideas of 
Peirce and Bergson independently, I will then show 
how they need to be taken more seriously in order 
to overcome limitations in Whitehead’s philosophy. 
Supposing we consider the addition of five and six 
to make eleven. We could consider this in relation 
to five people getting together with six other people 
to form a cricket team. In terms of Whitehead’s 
metaphysics, this can be characterized in terms of 
the prehensions of high grade actual occasions 
within each of these individuals, themselves 
functioning the way they do because they are within 
an immense number of personal societies of actual 
occasions which make up the bodies of the 
individuals and their natural and social 
environments. These high grade actual occasions 
(or rather, personal societies of them) then form 
themselves through the common ingression of this 
form of definiteness (along with a range of other 
eternal objects, physical, subjective and conceptual, 
some mathematical, some not) into the ‘pattern of 
togetherness’ of a cricket team. The addition of five 
and six and the interpretation of this event through 
this summation would then provide a one-sided but 
within limits a valid and important description of 
the event. As eleven members they are then able to 
ingress more complex forms of definiteness, for 
instance, associated with fielding. Such a pattern is 
not merely eleven players in a spatial arrangement 
but also involves complex interactions with each 
other and the opposing team. It is possible that in 
the effort to win, entirely new patterns might be 
envisaged and implemented, that is, ingressed, 
patterns which have always been possibilities (i.e. 
eternal objects) but have never before been 
actualized, and these could require new 
mathematical descriptions. 
While this example exemplifies Whitehead’s 
characterization of how eternal objects come to 
ingress in personal societies of actual occasions 
which are then mathematically describable, it also 
raises questions about the applicability of 
Whitehead’s proposals to other cases. Suppose we 
consider the much more complex mathematics of 
catastrophe theory, a development of differential 
geometry. This was developed by René Thom and 
was largely inspired by a biologist strongly 
influenced by Whitehead, C.H. Waddington, to 
characterize epigenesis, the differentiation of cells 
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and generation of form in the development of 
organisms. Under the influence of Whitehead, 
Waddington had characterized this development as 
a form of concrescence which involves self-
stabilizing paths of development which, at times 
became unstable, leading to situations where 
different paths could be and sometimes are taken. 
Thom showed how these paths, their stability and 
instability, and sudden changes of path could be 
modelled mathematically. Apart from illicitly 
extending the notion of concrescence from actual 
occasions to personal societies of actual occasions 
(that is, illicitly from the perspective of 
Whitehead’s categories), the problem here is the 
nature of the conceptual prehensions of the actual 
occasions of these personal societies. Can we really 
believe that high grade actual occasions within the 
nuclei of cells are able to prehend and choose to 
ingress the complex mathematical patterns 
(including their operations) described by 
catastrophe theory? Could we account for 
cancerous growths destroying this whole process 
through Whitehead’s concepts? How would we 
characterize a stray piece of shrapnel knocking out 
the developing brain of an Iraqi child through 
conceptual prehensions? 
The difficultly in conceiving the actualization of 
mathematical forms through their ingression by 
personal societies of actual occasions can be 
highlighted by considering the higher grade actual 
occasions associated with human consciousness. 
Suppose we consider the efforts of Brian Arthur to 
use the mathematics associated with complexity 
theory (involving the use of non-linear equations) to 
characterize economic processes. Arthur’s primary 
concern has been with ‘increasing returns’ 
generated by positive feedback loops which 
augment the dominance of products, actors and 
regions within the economy (although implicitly 
increasing returns imply there are concomitant self-
reinforcing patterns of decreasing returns). Arthur’s 
work destroyed the assumption of mainstream 
economists that free markets will lead to an 
equilibrium with the optimum allocation of scarce 
resources to satisfying unlimited wants. While 
Arthur considered products and individual actors, 
his original interest was in regions, to account for 
the observations of Jane Jacobs on how cities took 
off to generate increasingly complex patterns of 
economic activity.58 The point of Jacobs’ analysis 
was that such take off was and is not entirely 
predictable and is not the result of design by any of 
                                                        
58 See ‘Positive Feedback in the Economy’ in W. Brian 
Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the 
Economy, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994, 
chap.1. 
the actors, but a by-product of individual decisions 
by vast numbers of actors with no thought for the 
economy of the city as a whole. So, the process 
studied by Arthur could hardly be characterized 
entirely as the prehension of the patterns of 
togetherness studied by complexity theorists by 
high grade actual occasions, since a feature of these 
patterns is that they are the outcome of intentions of 
people who do not intend, and in fact are not even 
aware of, the patterns they are actualizing (although 
later actors might take cognizance in their decisions 
of the patterns that had emerged). If this is the case 
with many patterns generated by humans, it is likely 
to be even more common in the pre- and proto-
biotic world. 
Of course economists can influence governments of 
cities and countries, and in this way the patterns of 
complexity theory could be ingressed by the 
conceptual prehensions of high grade actual 
occasions within their governors and the 
economists who advise them. In fact 
‘protectionists’, that is politicians who promoted 
tariff and other barriers to trade in order to develop 
national economies, could be said to have had some 
sense of the ‘patterns of togetherness’ which would 
generate the self-generating complexity studied by 
economists such as Arthur. In these cases we could 
perhaps think of the high grade actual occasions 
within them prehending these patterns before the 
nature of these patterns were clarified by 
mathematicians. However, such politicians pre-
existed complexity theory. Present day politicians 
are much more likely to be guided in their 
economic policy decisions by mainstream neo-
classical economists with no knowledge of or 
interest in Arthur’s work. In the case of Australia, 
the consequent removal of tariff barriers and other 
means to promote a national economy has led to a 
downward spiral of deindustrialisation, trade 
deficits, asset inflation and massive increases in net 
national and personal debt along with huge and still 
growing disparities of wealth and income, a 
downward spiral disguised by treating revenue 
generated by selling off public assets and natural 
and accumulated social resources as income. As in 
Argentina which followed similar economic 
policies, the eventual outcome of this is likely to be 
chaos. In this, the ‘pattern of togetherness’ of a 
downward spiral of the economy is a by-product of 
the conceptual prehensions of the economy within 
the high grade actual occasions of economists and 
politicians intending, through their policies, patterns 
quite different from the patterns which are likely to 
unfold in the near future. There have been even 
higher grade actual occasions within radical 
economists and process philosophers such as 
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myself promoting different public policies, policies 
which would preserve the national economy and its 
natural environment, but these have had no 
influence on policies enacted. Which patterns 
processes prehend and attempt to realize and which 
patterns are sidelined can only be understood in 
terms of the power relations and power struggles 
between component processes prehending different 
patterns, something to which Whitehead paid little 
attention. 
Despite some illumination of the relationship 
between mathematics and actuality, it seems that 
Whitehead’s philosophy is inadequate to all items 
of experience. 
 
AUGMENTING WHITEHEAD 
As noted, Whitehead never thought of his work as 
completed; his philosophy was continually 
evolving. To some extent he was trying to go 
beyond Bergson and the pragmatists influenced by 
Peirce, but he was more influenced by James than 
either of these two philosophers, and did not 
incorporate into his own work some of Bergson’s 
and Peirce’s most important insights. To some 
extent this was deliberate; Whitehead was 
concerned to show that the analytical intellect could 
grasp more of the reality of becoming than Bergson 
believed; in other cases Whitehead has not been 
aware of or ignored ideas developed by these 
thinkers. Furthermore, there were other thinkers in 
the tradition of process philosophy whose insights 
Whitehead was barely aware of. Briefly, I will 
suggest some ways in which Whitehead’s 
philosophy could be augmented by appropriating 
some of the insights of other process philosophers, 
particularly of Bergson and Peirce, to make more 
plausible his analysis of the achievements and 
limitations of mathematics. In the light of these 
ideas, I believe Whitehead’s notion of 
‘concrescence’ and ‘prehension’ should be revised. 
The notion of ‘eternal object’ should also be 
revised, or possibly abandoned (as possibly 
Whitehead did abandon it).59 
To begin with, a general point should be made in 
relation to Whitehead’s metaphysics. One of the 
features of the whole tradition of process thought, 
from Anaximander onwards (including Peirce, and 
to a lesser extent Bergson), has been the view that 
order in the world has in some sense emerged from 
a background of disorder, flux or chaos. 
Anaximander characterized the cosmos as 
                                                        
59 On this, see Code, ‘On Whitehead’s Almost 
Comprehensive Naturalism’, p.25ff. 
developing through the limiting of the unlimited, 
and emphasised the precarious nature of what 
emerged in this way, characterizing its existence as 
an ‘injustice’ that eventually would have to be paid 
for. Even the Pythagoreans accepted the dichotomy 
between the limited and the unlimited. Heraclitus, 
to some extent defending Anaximander against later 
philosophers, characterized the cosmos as in 
perpetual motion and emphasised the central place 
within it of strife and conflict. It is only through a 
balance between opposites that the existence of 
anything is maintained, and nothing is permanent 
except this principle, Heraclitus claimed. As noted, 
Peirce also assumed that necessity in the world 
arose from chaos and chance through limitation. 
Recently, it has been argued in process physics that 
it is necessary to postulate an ‘intrinsic randomness’ 
or ‘self-referential noise’ to generate a self-
organising relational information system, 
sufficiently rich that self-referencing is possible.60 
Whitehead in his concern to avoid the charge of 
anti-intellectualism developed a cosmology which 
gave only a derivative and thereby relatively small 
place to disorder and conflict.61 The problematic 
nature of this becomes evident when efforts are 
made to interpret reality through his metaphysics, 
as I have attempted here. This limitation, I suggest, 
should be borne in mind as relevant to all other 
limitations of Whitehead’s metaphysics and efforts 
to overcome these. 
Bergson’s most important insights pertain to the 
nature of duration. The order associated with 
processes themselves is essentially a durational 
order in which extension is a subordinate aspect, 
Bergson argued. Physical time is not infinitely 
divisible. To some extent Whitehead incorporated 
this insight into his philosophy, but not all aspects 
of it. Bergson argued for a ‘pulsational’ theory of 
time, not an atomic theory of time which 
surreptitiously reintroduces instants at the 
beginning and end of each temporal atom.62 
Secondly, Bergson argued that not only does nature 
consist of processes which are essentially 
durational, but that there are different minimum 
durations, with longer durational processes being 
made up of overlapping shorter durational 
processes.63 As in the relationship of a melody to 
                                                        
60 See Reginald T. Cahill and Valerie V. Dvoeglazov, Process 
Physics: From Informational Theory to Quantum Space and 
Matter, Hauppauge NY: Nova Science Publications, 2005.  
61 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, p.91. 
62 On this, see Milič Čapek, Bergson and Modern Physics, 
New York: Reidel, p.205. 
63 See Čapek, Bergson and Modern Physics, p.159. See also 
Pete A. Y. Gunther, ‘Bergson, Mathematics, and Creativity’, 
Process Studies, 28:3-4, Fall-Winter 1999, 271ff. 
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the notes which make it up, supervening longer 
durational processes should be seen as genuinely 
emergent, having characteristics and dynamics and 
an order not entirely explicable in terms of their 
originating conditions and the shorter durational 
processes of which they are composed. Bergson 
could allow for a great variety of interacting 
processes on this basis, including hierarchical order.  
Such ideas have been recently put forward again by 
hierarchy theorists, notably by Howard Pattee, 
Timothy Allen and Stanley Salthe, among others, 
who have argued that emergence is associated with 
new constraints emerging which are not in the 
initial conditions.64 While developed without 
reference to pre-twentieth century thought (or to 
Bergson), this conception of nature revives 
Anaximander’s conception of cosmos as having 
formed through the limiting of the unlimited (an 
idea also taken up further developed by Schelling at 
the end of the eighteenth century).65 Along with the 
notion of different minimum durations, or different 
process rates, this has enabled Pattee, Allen and 
Salthe to clarify the nature of both emergence and 
hierarchical ordering in nature. Treating time as 
pulsational rather than atomic and treating 
causation as essentially a matter of constraining,66 
overcomes a number of difficulties in Whitehead’s 
philosophy, but then requires a rethinking of the 
nature of concrescence.  
On the basis of this pulsational, multi-levelled view 
of time and conception of causation as constraining, 
I have suggested elsewhere that actual occasions 
and societies of actual occasions be treated as 
ontologically on a par, without any need to explain 
entirely societies of actual occasions though 
concrescence of their component actual occasions.67 
If the different ontological status granted to actual 
occasions and societies of actual occasions is 
abandoned, if we allow that societies of actual 
                                                        
64 For a short account of hierarchy theory, see Valerie Ahl & 
T.F.H. Allen, Hierarchy Theory: A Vision, Vocabulary, and 
Epistemology, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. 
For more comprehensive studies, see T.F.H. Allen and 
Thomas B. Starr, Hierarchy: Perspectives for Ecological 
Complexity, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982, and Stanley N. Salthe, Evolving Hierarchical 
Systems, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985. 
65 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature, [1799] trans. Keith R. Peterson, N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press, 2004, p.17ff. 
66 For a more developed defence of the notion of causation 
as constraining, see Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in Action: 
Intentional Behaviour as a Complex System, Cambridge, 
Mass. MIT Press, 1999, Chap. 9. 
67 Arran Gare, ‘Process Philosophy and the Emergent Theory 
of Mind: Whitehead, Lloyd Morgan and Schelling’, 
Concrescence: The Australasian Journal of Process Thought, 
3, 2002. 
occasions are also actual entities, then in terms of 
Whitehead’s philosophy we should identify actual 
entities with ‘organisms’. Alternatively, following 
von Bertalanffy we could speak of ‘systems’, which 
is very close to the notion of ‘organism’ without the 
connotations of referring only to biological entities. 
The problem with both these notions is that they 
presuppose too much coherence in actual entities to 
deal with marginal cases. They do not give a place 
to chaos and actual entities close to chaos. Even 
Dorothy Emmet’s notion of ‘things-in-process’ 
implies too much coherence or definiteness.68 Can a 
language or a culture be characterized as an 
‘organism’ a ‘system’ or a ‘thing-in-process’? To 
acknowledge both the dependence of actual entities 
on their environments and components while at the 
same time their partial autonomy from the 
conditions of their emergence (that is, as immanent 
causes of their own becoming), I suggest that we 
speak merely of ‘patterns-in-process’ or simply 
‘processes’ which in their most elementary form 
can be nothing more than enduring centres of action 
(or patterns of such centres), centres which are not 
merely the effects of other processes. The notion of 
organisms or systems should then be reserved for 
more organized processes. 
It is then necessary to see all processes as in 
relation not only to past processes and to future 
possibilities, but also in relation to co-becoming 
processes which support or facilitate, threaten or 
hinder their becoming. This means that it is 
necessary to accord different powers to processes to 
maintain themselves in existence and flourish, and 
to augment or to undermine and even destroy other 
processes (as Nietzsche, following Heraclitus and 
Boscovich, had argued, and which Aleksandr 
Bogdanov made central to his ‘tektology’, the 
general theory of organization which was the 
precursor to systems theory). Some interactions 
between processes might result in destruction or 
radical modification of the processes involved, 
while in other cases the interaction might generate 
enduring patterns of interaction the outcome of 
which is the coming into being of emergent 
processes with their own autonomous dynamics 
which then alter by constraining the processes 
which gave rise to them. In such cases it might be 
necessary to allow for the possibility of ongoing 
communication between these interacting 
processes. In these cases, even where there is 
emergence of new processes, some degree of 
contingency and even chaos is added to the world. 
Along with such contingency there is a kind of 
                                                        
68 Dorothy Emmet, The Passage of Nature, Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1992, chap.5. 
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order produced in the world associated with the 
relationships of power between processes which is 
derivative from and can only be understood through 
and in relationship to processes without this being 
prehended by the interacting processes producing 
this order. Spatial form, for instance, as the order of 
potential for causal independence and interaction 
between processes could be generated (at least 
initially) by processes without this being prehended 
as such by them. The form of an unplanned city 
might be generated in this way, as might the form 
of a crystal. That is, larger patterns can and 
frequently do emerge of which component 
processes are not only blind, but do not have any 
feeling for whatsoever, at least initially. 
Peirce’s and Whitehead’s metaphysics, although 
developed independently, have much in common, 
and the limitations of each are illuminated by the 
other, while each provides resources for the other to 
overcome these limitations.69 The aspect of Peirce’s 
philosophy which in my view is most important as a 
means to revise Whitehead’s philosophy, 
particularly his notion of ‘prehension’, is his work 
on semiotics, particularly as this came to be 
appreciated after Peirce’s metaphysical writings 
came to be taken more seriously.70 Central to all 
semiosis is that it involves interpretation which 
could be mistaken and involves hypothetical 
thinking or ‘abduction’. Semiosis is triadic (a sign, 
an object and an interpretant), allowing for the 
possibility of each interpretant itself becoming a 
sign in turn to be interpreted, possibly creatively, 
generating a new interpretant. This triadic relation 
makes possible endless semiosis, generating webs 
of semiosis and the development of more and more 
complex kinds of semiosis. It is important to 
appreciate that an interpretant in semiosis need not 
be a thought. It can be growth of a particular kind. 
In his study of ‘phytosemiotics’ (semiosis in 
plants), deploying ideas from von Uexküll and 
Peirce (or at least thinkers influenced by Peirce), 
Kalevi Kull characterized a vegetative sign system 
as ‘the system that is responsible for the genesis of 
multicellular biological form, the whole 
morphology of the body.’71 The biological form 
                                                        
69 See for instance Murray Code, Vagueness, Rationality, 
and the Lure of Logic, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995. 
70 See Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, 
trans. Barbara J. Haveland, Bloomington: Indianan University 
Press, 1996. See also Torkild Leo Thellefsen, ‘C.S. Peirce’s 
Evolution Sign: an Analysis of Depth and Complexity within 
Peircean Sign Types and Peircean Evolution Theory’, 
S.E.E.D. (Semiotics, Evolution, Energy, and Development) 1: 
2 (December 2001), (no page numbers) 
71 Kalevi Kull, ‘An Introduction to phytosemiotics: Semiotic 
botany and vegetative sign systems’, Sign System Studies, 
28 (2000), p.344. 
taken by the organism is essentially an interpretant, 
the outcome of interpreting its internal (including 
DNA) and external environment. While being the 
dominant form of semiosis in plants, this vegetative 
semiosis occurs in all multicellular organisms. 
Beyond such vegetative semiosis is semiosis where 
the interpretant is moving or acting in a certain 
way. Only with highly developed forms of 
consciousness do we have semiosis independent of 
growth and action, and such semiosis presupposes 
the other forms of semiosis. Peirce’s analysis of 
semiosis provides a better basis than Whitehead’s 
metaphysics for understanding the creativity in 
nature, particular in relation to the primordial chaos 
of nature and to on-going interaction between co-
existing processes. 
If we are to speak of ‘processes’ as actual entities 
and allow some order which is generated without 
being in any sense ‘prehended’, if we allow that 
Peirce’s notion of semiosis is superior in some 
ways to Whitehead’s analysis of prehension, why 
should the notions of ‘concresence’ and 
‘prehension’ be retained? The notion of 
concrescence assumes the validity of Bergson’s 
claim that the pre-eminent order in the world is 
durational, while giving a place to diversity and the 
unification of this diversity in particular instances 
of becoming. It gives a place to proto-memory and 
proto-anticipation (perhaps involving proto-
imagination) in the process of becoming and 
provides a basis for analysing both unity and 
diversity. It is important to retain this. The notion of 
prehension implies that causation is not merely a 
matter of something having an effect on something 
else, but that what is affected is actively responding 
to what is influencing it. This notion also should be 
retained. How then should the notions of 
‘concrescence’ and ‘prehension’ be modified?  
While ‘limitation’ (as self-limitation) has been 
given a place in concrescence by Whitehead to 
characterize the constraints of other actual 
occasions and decision between which possibilities 
to ingress,72 the notion of ‘process’ outlined above 
suggests an even a greater place needs to be given 
to this concept. Limitation or constraint in 
concrescence of a process is the defining feature of 
its existence as an emergent entity. It is by virtue of 
self-constraining and constraining of its relationship 
to other processes that processes maintain 
themselves and their distinctive ordering; in fact, it 
is a major aspect of their ordering and facilitative of 
other ordering. The constraints imposed on and then 
embraced by individuals by language, for instance, 
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are central to the formation of humans as such and 
facilitate complex forms of communication and 
cooperation. In the case of compound individuals, 
such as human communities, the component 
processes are constrained and they become self-
constraining, sustaining hierarchical ordering 
involving different process rates or ‘durations’. It is 
in relation to this more complex notion of 
concrescence that the notion of prehension needs to 
be re-examined.  
As noted, prehension is an aspect of the active 
response of processes to the influences upon it. If 
concrescence is more complex than Whitehead 
allowed, involving self-constraining, constraining 
of components and mutual constraining associated 
ongoing interaction (possibly communication) 
between processes, then prehension is also likely to 
be more complex. In particular, it is necessary to 
reconsider the place of ‘forms of definiteness’ in 
prehension. In many, if not most instances, 
concrescence does not involve prehensions of forms 
of definiteness, at least initially. Rather, 
definiteness emerges slowly through the 
concrescence. This is evident in the case of 
‘conceptual prehensions’. The architectural theorist 
Christopher Alexander has argued convincingly that 
it is precisely the effort by architects to specify 
(prehend) the final form of a building in all its 
detail that has generated the desolation of modern 
built-up environments. If buildings are to be 
produced which are alive and beautiful, it is 
necessary that these unfold through myriad small 
decisions by all those involved in the building, each 
of whom has developed a ‘feel for the whole’ so 
that the final form, grasped only vaguely to begin 
with, emerges through a series of structure 
preserving transformations.73 And it is such 
structure preserving transformations that 
characterize all life, Alexander has argued. 
Prehensions of preceding or co-existent processes 
can involve grasping the definiteness of objects (as 
for instance of the bricks from which the building is 
constructed) but in other cases, for instance the 
broader natural environment and the processes 
unfolding within it, or efforts to develop a new idea 
or new way of thinking, what is involved is a much 
less focused feel for these with much less 
definiteness. It involves what Michael Polanyi 
characterized as the tacit knowledge of 
                                                        
73 Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order: An Essay on 
the Art of Building and The Nature of the Universe: Book Two: 
The Process of Creating Life, Berkeley: The Center for 
Environmental Structure, 2002, chap.3 
‘indwelling’74 which might not be able to be made 
more definite because reality itself might be 
indefinite. 
It is in rethinking prehension in the light of such 
complexity that Peirce’s analysis of semiosis 
becomes relevant. While there are forms of 
prehension that are dyadic rather than triadic, and 
do not involve any kind of interpretation are in no 
sense forms of semiosis (in response to chance 
events and ‘brute fact’, for instance), many 
prehensions, particularly those associated with life, 
do involve interpretation and in fact are forms of 
semiosis as characterized by Peirce. Incorporating 
Peirce’s analysis of semiosis (and the work of the 
semioticians influenced by Peirce) provides the 
basis for a much richer analysis of prehension than 
that offered by Whitehead (and, although I do not 
want to go into this here, the basis for overcoming 
problematic aspects of Whitehead’s analysis of the 
relationship between present actual occasions and 
the past). The incorporation of hierarchy theory and 
semiosis into Whitehead’s metaphysics can also be 
the basis for relating each of these to each other, 
and for clarifying the nature of each. Semiosis 
requires hierarchical order of processes 
characterized by different process rates to enable 
signs to endure with some stability relative to other 
processes for interpretation to be possible, and 
hierarchical order can be fruitfully analysed through 
the study of semiosis.75 Allowing hierarchical 
ordering with different kinds of semiosis also 
allows for a better understanding of the nature of 
embodiment and what it means to be embodied. 
 
RETHINKING THE PLACE OF MATHEMATICS IN A 
CREATIVE COSMOS 
What difference does this revision of Whitehead’s 
core concepts have for the way mathematics and its 
relation to the world is understood? As we have 
seen, there are two sides to Whitehead’s answer to 
this. The first is associated with his conception of 
mathematics as abstraction, treating as disjoint what 
is in reality conjoined, and the second is associated 
with Whitehead’s metaphysics according to which 
mathematical forms are instantiated though the 
conceptual prehensions of actual occasions. For 
Whitehead, these are consistent since the 
conceptual prehensions of mathematical forms in 
concrescence never occur in isolation but are 
                                                        
74 Michael Polanyi, ‘Tacit Knowing’, Knowing and Being, ed. 
Marjorie Grene, Chicago: Uni. of Chicago Press, 1969, Part 
Three. 
75 As Hoffmeyer has shown. See Hoffmeyer, Signs of 
Meaning in the Universe, chap.3. 
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conjoined with other prehensions to produce the 
rich, sensible world in which we find ourselves. 
What I have written above pertains mainly to 
Whitehead’s metaphysics, which appears more 
problematic, but it also has implications for 
epistemology and suggests limitations to 
Whitehead’s characterization of mathematics as 
abstraction. 
The work of Peirce is most important here. Peirce 
would concur with Whitehead that mathematics 
involves abstraction and could have appreciated 
both Whitehead’s argument that abstraction is 
essential to the evolution of life, and his criticism of 
the tendency to take abstractions for reality.76 He 
might have agreed with Whitehead’s efforts to 
reduce the level of abstraction of mathematics and 
to treat mathematical operations as dynamic. But 
Peirce appears to have more emphatically given a 
place to the imaginative creativity involved in 
developing any kind of abstraction, including 
mathematical abstractions. A study of the history of 
mathematics shows that like scientific and 
metaphysical theories, mathematics too is 
developed through the creative explication of 
analogies and metaphors. Giving a place to analogy 
and metaphor, Peirce’s philosophy offers a greater 
appreciation of the creative input of mathematicians 
in construing the world mathematically. Despite 
Bergson’s critical attitude towards mathematical 
thinking, his analysis of how the intellect works, 
particularly as this has been elaborated by Milic 
Čapek, provides support for such a characterization 
of mathematics. His study highlights what is really 
the creative work that generates what appears to be 
the rational, coherent, transparent world construed 
through mathematics. What Bergson has revealed is 
the extent to which mathematical and logical 
thinking is dominated by spatial metaphors and the 
creativity involved in explicating such metaphors, 
an aspect of his work that has been clarified by 
Čapek.77 (That mathematics is the explication of 
metaphor has been supported recently by George 
Lakoff and Rafael E. Nunez.)78 
It is when such creative work is interpreted through 
metaphysics that the significance of this difference 
between Peirce and Whitehead becomes fully 
manifest. To appreciate the importance of this, it is 
first necessary to acknowledge the importance of 
other contributions to process philosophy. As I 
                                                        
76 For Peirce on abstraction, see Charles Sanders Peirce, 
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78 See George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nunez, Where 
Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings 
Mathematics into Being, New York: Perseus, 2001. 
suggested, it is necessary to acknowledge more 
chaos and conflict in the world than Whitehead was 
wont to allow. Acknowledging these implies that 
the world is less amenable to full comprehension 
than Whitehead believed. In particular, much of 
what has been successfully comprehended by 
mathematicians cannot be accounted for as due to 
the ingression into reality through the conceptual 
prehensions of actual occasions. Much of this 
mathematical order can be seen to be the by-
product interactions and conflicts between 
processes that could not have been prehended by 
them, and in some cases, are the by-product of the 
inadequacy of what prehensions have been made.  
Does acknowledging that some kind of 
mathematical order emerges in the world without 
any kind of prehension of this, at least initially, lead 
back to some form of limited Pythagoreanism in 
which the mathematical order discovered by 
mathematicians in the world is seen to have been 
already there before it was discovered? In this case, 
mathematics itself must be seen to be a realm of 
eternal truths embodied in the physical world which 
is discovered by mathematicians. Such a view of 
the world is difficult to reconcile with Peirce’s and 
Bergson’s appreciation of the creativity involved in 
the development of mathematics. We seem to be 
back with the old conflict between realism and 
constructivism which both Peirce and Whitehead 
sought to overcome. It is here that the fruitfulness 
of conceiving of prehension as semiosis reveals 
itself.  
Both Peirce and Whitehead had appreciated how 
developments in logic liberated thought to deal with 
relations and the significance of this liberation. It 
was then no longer necessary to conceive relations 
as binary relations of substances to their attributes. 
Whitehead saw how this could free philosophers 
from the tendency to treat colours as in a beautiful 
sunset as either an attribute of physical objects or as 
an attribute of the mind. Allowing triadic relations 
enables us to avoid either position and treat the 
beautiful sunset in relation to both the perceived 
object and the perceiver. Peirce’s theory of semiosis 
generalizes this insight so that all experience is 
understood in terms of such triadic relations. The 
development of more adequate comprehension of 
the world is a matter of creatively interpreting signs 
of objects to produce more adequate signs which 
can be the point of departure for further creative 
attempts at comprehension. The interpretation of 
physical or vegetative semiosis or the semiosis of 
animal activity through the theoretical elaborations 
of scientists and philosophers is just a continuation 
of the endless semiosis that pervades much, if not 
all, the cosmos, a process in which signs which are 
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themselves interpretants, are continually being 
reinterpreted, generating new signs which are then 
also interpreted again. The later interpretant can not 
only interpret signs but achieve a comprehension of 
the limits of what had been achieved by these 
earlier interpretants. In the case of humans, 
semiosis can involve interpreting earlier signs as 
interpretants and evaluating their adequacy or 
inadequacy as interpretants, showing why later 
interpretants provide more adequate interpretation 
of its object. Thus, in the mathematical 
interpretation of primitive processes, processes of 
blind assertion by physical processes or processes 
of growth in vegetation, can involve interpretation 
of these processes in relation to a spatial order of 
potentialities which has been generated without 
having been in any way prehended or interpreted by 
these more primitive processes, revealing at the 
same time the limited prehension of the primitive 
processes that generated this order and new 
possibilities for action or growth. The development 
of such mathematical interpretants is then an 
addition to this process of endless semiosis, an 
addition which is able to map out potentialities of 
which the interpretants of more primitive processes 
were and are oblivious. 
But for all its achievements there is no reason to 
think of mathematics as the highest form of 
semiosis. It is possible that signs that are re-
interpreted are in some way more profound 
interpretants than subsequent interpretants, even if 
subsequent interpretants have revealed new 
possibilities or achieved greater reflexivity. This is 
evident when people from literate cultures interpret 
people from oral cultures. Interpretants (for 
example the work of anthropologists) might reveal 
aspects of life in oral cultures of which their 
participants were blind, but there is often an 
appreciation by anthropologists that they can never 
capture the richness of the symbolic life of these 
cultures. Similarly, while ethologists and 
biosemioticians have made enormous advances in 
interpreting the sign systems and worlds of animals 
of all kinds, they are not in a position to fully 
appreciate what it is like to experience the world as 
a bee or a bat. If semiosis in literate cultures can be 
superior, it is because it can facilitate far greater 
efforts to interpret other cultures and other forms of 
life, and so can develop more reflexive forms of 
semiosis. This has been associated with two 
tendencies (sometimes combined, as in the case of 
Aristotle), both responses to the debilitating effects 
of cultural relativism that tends to follow this 
reflexivity, one to find some absolute foundation 
which stands above every culture, the other to 
humility about whatever claims to knowledge are 
being made and a continual quest to engage with 
different points of view, expose taken for granted 
assumptions to overcome limited perspectives and 
to develop more comprehensive views of the world, 
views which incorporate the achievements of 
previous and rival ways of interpreting the world. 
The first tendency has been associated with the 
celebration of mathematical and logical reasoning, 
claiming that it provides absolute knowledge. In 
response to such claims, Bergson (among others) 
attempted to uphold an alternative absolute 
accessible through intuition. This is still a deviant 
form of the first tendency. Whitehead and Peirce 
exemplify the second kind of response.  
While Whitehead tried to develop a comprehensive 
view of the world which would give a place to 
mathematics and logic and transcend the limitations 
of all previous efforts to achieve a comprehensive 
world-view, Peirce’s notion of endless semiosis 
provides a better basis for upholding this second 
response coherently. Synthesising this with 
Whitehead’s metaphysics, mathematics can be seen 
as a major advance in developing the means to 
interpret the world. While failing in its efforts to 
achieve apodicticity, it has facilitated great 
achievements in abstract thinking. But looked at 
from a semiotic perspective, it has to be seen as the 
elaboration of one set of analogies or metaphors 
which could not form the basis of a comprehensive 
view of the world. As Bergson and (following him) 
Čapek have revealed, mathematics is the 
elaboration of a spatial metaphor, and this metaphor 
is severely limited when it comes to appreciating 
duration and creative becoming, making sentient 
life unintelligible. If a comprehensive view of the 
world is to be achieved, it has to be subordinated to 
some other metaphor. Peirce, Bergson and 
Whitehead each offered and elaborated alternative 
root metaphors which were broader than and 
encompassed mathematical thinking. 
In his effort to uphold mathematics and its 
achievements while appreciating its limitations, 
Whitehead rejected the extreme abstraction which 
reduces all mathematics to tautologies. 
Mathematical operations themselves are privileged 
over statements of truth, and even then the insight 
provided by these operations is regarded as one 
sided, unable to do full justice to the richness of the 
world. This way of thinking about mathematics is 
now evident in complexity theory where theorists 
watch computer images generated by non-linear 
equations. However, Whitehead’s characterization 
of this as reducing the level of abstraction, while 
doing much to vindicate the potential of 
mathematics to be reconceived so that it is 
consistent with process metaphysics, fails to fully 
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account for what Whitehead was doing. In fact 
Whitehead had embraced a process view of the 
world and was reconceiving mathematics in terms 
of this process view, not merely avoiding excessive 
abstraction. This process view was not merely 
paying attention to concrete experience. If one 
examines carefully Whitehead’s thinking, 
particularly in Science and the Modern World, it 
can be seen that Whitehead was guided in his 
thinking, like Bergson, by reflecting on music. He 
was first of all using mind as a metaphor for 
understanding the whole of nature, but his view of 
mind was underpinned by using music to clarify the 
nature of duration within experience, sometimes 
using music directly as a metaphor to characterize 
physical processes.79 Mind interpreted through 
music functioned as a root metaphor to creatively 
redescribe the ultimate nature of reality, thereby 
reinterpreting all past thinking about the world, 
ourselves and our place in the world. Mathematics 
was reinterpreted by him through this new 
composite metaphor. Whitehead’s work is then a 
prime illustration of the chain of semiosis where 
ampliative thinking through the use of metaphors 
enables past signs to be interpreted (or to generate 
an interpretant) in a way which is radically new, in 
this case the past signs and the new interpretant 
being interpretations of the entire cosmos, including 
effort to understand it through mathematics. 
Once it is appreciated that this is what Whitehead 
was doing, and the major insights of Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, Schelling, Nietzsche, Bogdanov, 
Bergson and Peirce have been assimilated to 
Whitehead’s metaphysics, then we can also see that 
Whitehead needed to leave Pythagoreanism behind 
more definitively than he did. It is a bias of 
mathematical physicists to think that all 
explanations must map out a configuration space of 
all possibilities in terms of which what is actual can 
be specified, and then what possibilities will be 
actualized under different circumstances 
ascertained. As Stuart Kauffman has pointed out, 
this assumption was shared by Newton, Einstein 
and Bohr.80 Whitehead’s early postulation of a 
realm of eternal objects is perhaps an expression of 
this tacit assumption. But with the creativity made 
possible through semiosis, mapping out all 
possibilities that may exist in the future is not only 
impossible but meaningless. ‘Eternal objects’, as 
Murray Code has argued, themselves emerge and 
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evolve (and so should not be characterized as 
eternal objects).81 As in the case of particular 
processes, the concrescence of the universe as a 
whole (and life on earth) is opening up, creating 
and clarifying new possibilities, a process in which 
vague ideals are being given more definite form. 
The most adequate way to grasp the development of 
semiosis from its beginnings until the present, 
giving a place to chaos, conflict and vagueness as 
well as to what can be sharply defined, projecting a 
vague future which will be influenced by the 
creative work of semiosis, is not through 
mathematics but, as Kauffman argued, through 
stories.82 
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